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Administrative Law: Access to Review of
Official Action-Standing Under the Florida
Administrative Procedure Act
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The Florida Administrative Procedure Act provides the ve-
hicle through which Florida citizens can seek judicial or ad-
ministrative review of the actions of administrative agencies.
Before a litigant will be entitled to the benefits of these proce-
dures, however, he must satisfy certain threshold standing re-
quirements. This article critically examines Florida's standing
doctrine in the context of the structure and purpose of the Act
and the major federal decisions that have developed many of
the doctrine's central principles.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The widespread use of regulatory agencies to execute legisla-
tive policy is a current fact of political and economic life.1 Private
persons frequently encounter the constraints of agency regulations
as they conduct their business affairs and seek to acquire publicly
created benefits. There has been a greater propensity to use non-
legislative means to resolve social issues and political conflicts,
which has followed the growth of administrative regulation. In
Florida, the mechanism that regularizes the relationship between
the state and persons who wish to challenge official action, and
persons who need or want to act in concert with the state, is the
Florida Administrative Procedure Act (APA).2
A major aspect of the Florida APA is its comprehensive proce-
dural framework through which persons who are aggrieved or af-
fected by agency action can challenge the acts of state and local
administrative agencies. A central concept underlying this frame-
work is that persons must be sufficiently affected by official action
before they will be allowed to disrupt the governmental process by
pursuing the remedies of the APA. This standing requirement,
which is an express part of the legislative scheme, is necessary to
protect both the integrity and efficiency of the process, and the
interests of persons who in fact are affected and who would suffer
from either a delay in the process or an improvident decision liti-
gated by a nonaffected party. This article identifies the principles
that underlie the standing requirement by analyzing federal and
state administrative law decisions.
The APA details the procedures for challenging both agency
rulemaking and enforcement.3 The administrative rulemaking pro-
visions contain a procedure, section 120.54(4)(a) of the Florida
Statutes, 4 under which "[a]ny substantially affected person may
seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of any pro-
1. See generally Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REv. 1667 (1975).
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.50-.73 (1981).
3. Id. § 120.54. If an agency does not adopt specific rules of procedure to govern its
action, FLA. STAT. § 120.54(10) (1981) prescribes model rules.
4. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4)(a) (1981).
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posed rule on the ground that the proposed rule is an invalid exer-
cise of delegated legislative authority."" Section 120.56(1),, which
governs challenges to existing rules, provides in almost identical
language that "[any person substantially affected by a rule may
seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of the rule
on the ground that the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legis-
lative authority."
'7
In addition to rulemaking, administrative agencies also carry
out the executive functions of government and implement legisla-
tive enactments. These exercises of delegated authority include li-
censing, permitting, enforcement, and numerous adjudicatory mat-
ters that, by definition, determine a person's rights, privileges, or
interests under state law.8 The Florida APA attempts to ensure the
fairness of these administrative determinations through a system
of formal and informal hearings under section 120.57 of the Florida
Statutes.' The procedures "shall apply in all proceedings in which
the substantial interests of a party are determined by an
agency." 10
Thus, the standard of "substantiality" governs the entitlement
to hearings under sections 120.54(4)(a), 120.56(1), and 120.57."
The Florida cases appear to define "substantiality" under these
sections in a similar manner."2 This article suggests an analytical
framework for determining when a party has satisifed the APA's
"substantiality" requirement and therefore has standing to chal-
lenge agency action.
Part II of this article evaluates the Florida APA's provisions
for preenforcement review of administrative action, analyzing Flor-
5. Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, FLA. STAT. § 120.54(5) (1981) provides that "[any
person regulated by an agency or having a substantial interest in an agency rule may peti-
tion an agency to adopt, amend, or repeal a rule. . . ." Although this article does not focus
on this provision, it argues that the same factors will trigger standing under either subsec-
tion (4) or (5). Nothing in the APA or case law indicates that the analysis of "substantial-
ity" should be any different.
6. FLA. STAT. § 120.56(1) (1981).
7. Id. (emphasis added). According to FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(4)(d), .56(5) (1981), the
hearings in which such challenges are decided are subject to FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (1981).
Proceedings involving a disputed issue of material fact may require a formal hearing, ac-
cording to § 120.57(1). Informal proceedings are available under § 120.52(2) for cases not
involving disputed issues of material fact.
8. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 120.57, .60 (1981).
9. Id. § 120.57.
10. Id. (emphasis added).
11. Furthermore, one must be a "party" in the agency action that determines the sub-
stantial interest. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(10) (1981) defines "party."
12. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text infra.
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ida administrative law in the context of federal standing principles.
These principles form a coherent basis for resolving the standing
issue under the Florida APA. Part III examines the federal stand-
ing concepts in relationship to Florida Department of Offender
Rehabilitation v. Jerry,"' the leading Florida case on standing.
Part IV considers other Florida APA cases in which parties had
standing to challenge agency determinations that injured or
threatened injury to public entitlement program benefits, statuto-
rily created substantive interests, and traditional contract or prop-
erty rights. Part V examines recent developments in associational
standing, and Part VI considers the standing necessary for judicial
review of final agency rulings.
II. PREENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION
The major innovation of the Florida APA is its expanded sys-
tem of preenforcement review of agency action.14 Although the
APA does not expressly state that its purpose is to establish preen-
forcement review, the statutory scheme allows persons to challenge
rules that potentially affect their substantial interests. Expanded
preenforcement review in Florida corresponds with other state ad-
ministrative law reform efforts. According to one prominent
commentator:
The Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act
and a number of state statutes make general provision for judi-
cial review of agency positions through declaratory judgments,
with or without prior administrative proceedings to remove un-
certainties in scope or meaning. The [federal] APA does not,
and the draftsmen of the new state provisions have apparently
assumed that they were going beyond at least the explicit fed-
eral statutory guarantees in embracing the "principle [of] ad-
vance determination of the validity of administrative rules, and
[of] 'declaratory rulings,' affording advance determination of the
applicability of administrative rules to particular cases."'"
13. 353 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1978).
14. Although the legislative history of the APA is sparse, the Law Revision Council's
Reporter published Comments that support this conclusion. See 3 A. ENGLAND & L. LEVIN-
SON, FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW MANUAL Reporters' Comments (1979); England & Levin-
son, 1976 Developments in Florida Law: Administrative Law, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 749, 761
(1977).
15. Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative
Law, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1443, 1452 (1971). See also 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA-
TISE § 1.11, at 7-38 (2d ed. 1978): "The Uniform Law Commissioners speak of 'certain basic
principles of common sense, justice, and fairness that can and should prevail universally,'
[Vol. 35:815
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The former Florida APA provided that "affected part[ies]"
could seek judicial review of an administrative rule's validity in the
circuit courts. 16 The current APA requires every agency to issue
declaratory statements to petitioners setting forth "the agency's
opinion as to the applicability of a specified statutory provision or
of any rule or order of the agency as it applies to the petitioner in
his particular set of circumstances only."' 17 The current APA also
creates a Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) with the
power to conduct independent preenforcement hearings on the va-
lidity of rules.1" The administrative review process remedies the
deficiencies of the former statutes by "expanding the opportunities
for flexibility and informality in Florida administrative
processes." '19
The District Court of Appeal, First District, recently discussed
the underlying legislative intent of the rule challenge provisions of
the Florida APA. In Professional Firefighters, Inc. v. Department
of Health & Rehabilitative Services,"0 the First District held that
"[t]he APA permits prospective challenges to agency rulemaking
and does not require that an affected party comply with the rule at
his peril in order to obtain standing to challenge the rule."2 In
Firefighters, a union and three individual members challenged de-
partment rules that required state licensing of paramedics. The ad-
ministrative hearing officer had held that the individual petitioners
did not have standing to challenge the rules because they had not
applied for certification and had not alleged that the rules would
disqualify them from obtaining the required licenses. 2
The First District reversed because the administrative hearing
officer's reasoning
would preclude a challenge by anyone who had not first com-
plied with a rule and suffered injury, no matter how clear the
rule's applicability to, or substantial its effect on, the challenger.
... [including] [p]rovision for advance determination of the validity of administrative rules
16. FLA. STAT. § 120.30 (1973) (repealed 1974).
17. Id. § 120.565 (1981).
18. See id. § 120.65(1). The Division of Administrative Hearings is a division of the
State Department of Administration.
19. 3 A. ENGLAND & L. LEVINSON, supra note 14, Reporters' Comments, at 3. See also
THE FLORIDA BAR, FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 2.2, at 43 (1976).
20. 396 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
21. Id. at 1195.
22. Id.
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... When an agency sets up a new licensing or certification
requirement for an occupation or profession not previously sub-
ject to state-wide regulation or licensing, persons engaged in
that occupation or profession have standing to challenge the
proposed regulation.2
Thus, although preenforcement review is an integral part of the
Florida APA, it is clear that the legislative scheme also contem-
plates that the APA's benefits will be available only to the proper
parties under the proper circumstances. The concepts of substan-
tial effect and substantial interest govern access to the procedures
of the APA.
III. UNIFORM PRINCIPLES OF STANDING AND Jerry
The Florida APA does not define the "substantially affected"
language of sections 120.54(4)(a) and 120.56(1). The legislature left
the task to the courts and administrative agencies.24 Unlike the
broader standard of "affected person" that appears in other sec-
tions of the APA,25 the "substantially affected" standard requires a
relatively higher threshold of injury or threatened injury before a
person can challenge either proposed or adopted agency rules.2
This section of the article examines the meaning of "substantially
affected" under both section 120.54(4) and section 120.56(1).
27
23. Id. at 1195-96.
24. FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (1981) provides that one whose "substantial interests ... are
determined by an agency" has a right to an administrative hearing for a review of that
determination. Regarding the term "substantial interests," two leading commentators have
noted that "[tihe use of an undefined term in such a crucial provision of the Act is an
obvious invitation to agencies and courts to develop the meaning of the term." 2 A. ENG-
LAND & L. LEVINSON, supra note 14, § 11.02, at 3. The term "substantially affected" in §§
120.54(a) and 120.56(1) is equally open to interpretation. See note 27 infra.
25. Under FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3) (1981), "any affected person" may "present evidence
and argument on all issues under consideration" if he has made a request within 14 days
after the publication of the notice.
26. Florida Dep't of Offender Rehabilitation v. Jerry, 353 So. 2d 1230, 1232 (Fla. 1st
DCA), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1978). The court noted:
Section 120.30, Florida Statutes (1973), [the former APA] repealed by Ch.
74-310, Section 4, Laws of Florida, effective January 1, 1975, permitted any "af-
fected party" to obtain a judicial declaration of the validity of any rule of an
administrative agency by bringing a declaratory judgment action in the circuit
court of the county in which such party resides.
The legislature in enacting Sections 120.54(4)(a) and 120.56, employed more
restrictive language, "substantially affected", than it did in enacting Section
120.30. The legislature must be presumed to have intended a different result by
employing language describing a more limited scope of persons affected in a
given situation and less restrictive language in other situations.
27. Courts have applied the general considerations governing standing under FLA. STAT.
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Florida Department of Offender Rehabilitation v. Jerry8 was
the first decision to recognize the need for a standard to measure
the injury required for standing under the Florida APA. In Jerry
the District Court of Appeal, First District, reviewed the case of a
prison inmate who had been found guilty of unarmed assault, in
violation of a department rule.29 The rule also outlined the proce-
dures for subjecting offenders to disciplinary confinement and the
forfeiture of previously earned gain-time. After his release, the in-
mate, Leroy Jerry, challenged the validity of the rule's disciplinary
procedure, contending that the department had violated the proce-
dural guidelines of section 120.57 when it adopted the rule.30 The
First District declined to reach the merits because Jerry failed to
prove his injury and thus did not have standing"' to challenge the
rule under section 120.56(1). 81
The Jerry court could find few Florida cases that addressed
§§ 120.54(4), .56 (1981) ("substantially affected") to the determination of "substantial inter-
ests" under § 120.57. Two commentators disagree, however, with the proposition that stand-
ing under §§ 120.54(4) and 120.56(1) is coextensive with standing under § 120.57:
Section 120.54(4)(a) makes review of a proposed rule available to "any sub-
stantially affected person", and Section 120.56 makes review of an existing rule
available to "any person substantially affected." These two triggering phrases,
virtually indistinguishable from one another, are quite different from the trig-
gering phrase of Section 120.57, "in which the substantial interests of a party are
determined by an agency."
2 A. ENGLAND & L. LEVINSON, supra note 14, § 11.02(c)(1), at 10 (emphasis added).
In some respects, the three sections operate similarly. For example, the hearing proce-
dures under § 120.57 are also generally used for § 120.54(4) and § 120.56 challenges. There
are, however, some significant operational differences. First, both § 120.54(4) and § 120.56(1)
provide that determinations must be made by a hearing officer assigned by the Division of
Administrative Hearings (DOAH), without the other options available in some situations
under § 120.57. Second, the determination by the DOAH hearing officer under §§ 120.54(4)
and 120.56 "is final agency action," subject only to judicial review in the district court of
appeal. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(4), .56(5) (1981). Section 120.57 hearing officers may render a
recommended order, subject to final action by the agency head and the courts. Id. § 120.57.
Nonetheless, neither the legislative history of the APA nor the case law indicates that any
difference for determining standing should exist, except in some cases not involving preen-
forcement relief.
Section 120.57 additionally applies only in proceedings in which an agency determines
the substantial interests of a party. Therefore, one threshold difference is the necessity that
one be a party and have substantial interests determined. The point here, however, is that
the same concepts apparently govern both the "substantiality of interests" test and the
"substantially affected" test.
28. 353 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1978).
29. FLA. ADMIN. CODE Rule 33-3.08 (1981).
30. 353 So. 2d at 1231.
31. Id. at 1235.
32. FLA. STAT. § 120.56(1) (1981) states, "Any person substantially affected by a rule
may seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of the rule on the ground that
the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority."
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standing's and none that defined a "substantially affected" person.
It therefore turned to the federal APA and to major decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States delineating the degree of
injury required for standing to sue in the federal courts.3 4 The
First District noted that under the federal APA, a person must be
"'adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action'" to seek re-
dress in the courts. 5 Nevertheless, "[d]espite the dissimilarities of
the terms under the federal and Florida Acts,""6 the court ob-
served that "decisions involving standing in the federal courts
often turn upon issues pertaining to whether a person seeking re-
lief has shown that his interests are substantial and not illusory.
'8 7
The First District relied on Sierra Club v. Morton," Roe v.
Wade, e and especially O'Shea v. Littleton,0 to hold that Jerry's
33. The only Florida cases the court cited were A.S.I., Inc. v. Florida Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 334 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1976) and Gadsden State Bank v. Lewis, 348 So. 2d 343 (Fla.
1st DCA 1977).
34. 353 So. 2d at 1233.
35. Id. at 1233 & n.7 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976)).
36. 353 So. 2d at 1233.
37. Id. (emphasis added). Although the language of the Florida APA, unlike that of the
federal APA, includes the word "substantial," the First District applied federal standing
principles. One explanation may be that article III of the United States Constitution limits
federal court jurisdiction to "cases" or "controversies." The courts have construed this re-
quirement to mean that a plaintiff must have an "injury in fact" and that the injury must
fall within the statutorily protected "zone of interests." See Association of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). But see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79 (1978) ("[A] litigant must demonstrate. . . [nothing] more than
injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or
redress the claimed injury to satisfy the 'case or controversy' requirement of Art. III.").
In addition to the article III requirement, federal courts have imposed an additional
standing barrier as a rule of self-restraint, under which they have denied standing for pru-
dential reasons, even when a plaintiff has met the minimum article III injury requirement.
See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154. See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). By
statute, however, Congress may abrogate prudential limits on standing, as it did in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). Thus, courts may not deny access
to persons "adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning of a relevant statute" solely
because of prudential considerations. Id.
The prudential considerations of federal courts probably would not apply under the
Florida APA, because the principles that apply to the federal courts do not constrain Flor-
ida administrative hearing officers. Nevertheless, by applying the federal test, the Jerry
court interpreted "substantially affected" to be coextensive with the federal standing
requirement.
38. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). In Sierra Club an environmental group challenged the United
States Forest Service's proposal to develop Segovia National Forest's Mineral King Valley
into an extensive resort area. The group claimed a special interest in the continued mainte-
nance and conservation of the national park system. The Court denied the group standing
because it failed to show injury in fact or an interest beyond that shared by the general
public.
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe a woman challenged an anti-abortion statute, alleging a
[Vol. 35:815
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alleged injury was an insufficient basis for standing. Because Jerry
did not allege that he had lost gain-time, he effectively challenged
only the procedural rules that he might be subjected to if he com-
mitted a future infraction. Like the plaintiff's in O'Shea, Jerry was
unable to demonstrate an immediate injury. In O'Shea seventeen
blacks and two whites complained that law enforcement officers
were engaging in discriminatory bail-setting, sentencing, and
juryfee practices. The plaintiffs in O'Shea could only allege poten-
tial injury because at the time the lawsuit was filed, none of them
were on trial, awaiting trial, or serving an allegedly illegal sentence,
and thus were not subject to the alleged discriminatory practices.4I
The Supreme Court of the United States decided that the case was
nonjusticiable because the probability was too remote that any of
the plaintiffs -would ever be exposed to the allegedly discriminatory
criminal justice system. The Court "assume[d] that [the plaintiffs
would] conduct their activities within the law and so avoid prose-
cution and conviction as well as exposure to the challenged course
of conduct." 3
The First District compared the inmate's claim in Jerry to
that of the plaintiffs in O'Shea:
As in O'Shea, Jerry's prospects of future injury rest on the
likelihood that he will again be subjected to disciplinary confine-
ment because of possible future infractions of [the challenged
rule]. Whether this will occur, however, is a matter of specula-
tion and conjecture and we will not presume that Jerry, having
once committed an assault while in custody, will do so again. To
so presume would result only in illusory speculation which is
hardly supportive of issues of "sufficient immediacy and reality"
necessary to confer standing.4
possible future injury should she become pregnant and desire an abortion. The Court found
no present injury, and concluded that the potential for future injury was so attenuated that
it failed to meet the article III "case or controversy" requirement.
40. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
41. Id. at 496.
42. See note 48 and accompanying text infra.
43. 414 U.S. at 497.
44. 353 So. 2d at 1236. The Jerry case, which turned on the issue of standing, closely
.resembles federal decisions on a related problem of justiciability: ripeness. Although the
three United States Supreme Court cases cited by the Jerry court involved the federal
standing doctrine, the Jerry decision is must comparable to O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488 (1974), in which the Court held the case nonjusticiable because the plaintiffs failed to
show an immediate injury on grounds that more closely resembled ripeness.
To some extent, "standing" and "ripeness" represent artificial labels applied to condi-
tions underlying a purported dispute. The article III "case or controversy" requirement,
however, underlies both concepts. That requirement means, in part, that federal courts may
19811
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Jerry has been recognized as the leading Florida decision de-
fining "substantially affected."'4 ' Subsequent cases indicate, how-
ever, that Jerry's rationale, considered together with the underly-
ing purpose of the Florida APA,'4 requires additional clarification
to ensure its consistent application. Analyzing Jerry and adducing
its operative principles will promote the development of a standing
doctrine that recognizes the substantial injury requirement, yet
conforms with the purpose of the Florida APA.
The court's analysis in Jerry consists of two related factors.
First, Jerry did not challenge the substantive rule against assault.
Rather, he challenged only the procedures that would be applied
should he again be accused of violating the valid substantive rule.'
Second, the court refused to speculate on the probability that a
particular prisoner would be subsequently charged with violating a
substantive rule and thus become subject to the challenged proce-
dures. 48 Post-Jerry decisions on standing examine the immediacy
not issue advisory opinions. Because any decision will have a precedential effect on persons
situated similarly to the party in court, the judiciary closely scrutinizes the litigant's stand-
ing, and examines the issue's timeliness.
The standing doctrine seeks to ensure that a plaintiff has a sufficient injury and per-
sonal stake in the outcome of the litigation to present the issues fully and concretely. A
decision resulting from an improper party's "inadequate" presentation would prejudice
"proper" parties directly injured by the challenged rule. "Ripeness" means that the courts
will entertain only fully developed issues fit for judicial resolution. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 52-58, 60-62 (1978).
Although the O'Shea opinion did not expressly mention ripeness, the substance of the
decision implies that timeliness was the concern, and textbooks and treatises treat O'Shea
as a ripeness case. See, e.g., P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 48 (2d ed. Supp. 1981); G. GUN-
THER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1590 (1978).
45. At least one commentator has suggested abandoning Jerry as the "test" case for
administrative standing. See Kavanaugh, Administrative Standing Under Chapter 403:
What Does the Jerry Case Mean? 53 FLA. B.J. 729 (1979). Despite Kavanaugh's concerns,
Jerry does provide insight into the reasoning of the district court that had decided the most
cases under the APA.
46. See notes 14-23 and accompanying text supra.
47. Jerry was not asserting the right to engage in proscribed conduct.
48. To avoid speculating about the likelihood that a particular person will again be
subject to the rule, one could look to the class of persons affected by the rule. A substantial
number of prisoners will undoubtedly commit breaches of prison discipline in the future. By
focusing on the common sense dynamics of the group, the courts could avoid the difficulty
of imputing a propensity for lawlessness to any one individual. Professor Alan C. Swan,
Professor of Law at the University of Miami School of Law has suggested this perspective as
a possible alternative to the court's present approach.
Professor Swan recognizes however that the group should not be defined too broadly.
For example, the class of female Medicaid recipients of childbearing age is too broad to have
APA standing to challenge rules governing the availability of abortions, because there is no
reason to believe that any one, much less a substantial number, of the group will want an
[Vol. 35:815
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and reality of the alleged injury to evaluate its "substantial effect."
To analyze this aspect of standing properly, one must consider a
major purpose of the Florida APA: the regularization of the rela-
tionship between administrative agencies and regulated groups
through preenforcement review of proposed or final agency ac-
tions.' The lessons of federal administrative law are extremely
helpful in providing a meaningful interpretation of Jerry for future
application.
The federal APA does not expressly provide for preenforce-
ment review. 0 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United
States has ruled that an aggrieved party may seek such review. In
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,6 the Court upheld the availabil-
ity of preenforcement review of a regulation promulgated by the
Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) since
the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 2 did not expressly pre-
clude review.53 The Court also ruled that a challenge to the Com-
missioner's interpretation of the statute under which he issued the
regulation was a justiciable controversy "ripe" for judicial resolu-
tion. 4 Two factors that contributed to the holding were the fitness
of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties
that would result if the Court withheld court consideration. As de-
scribed below,5 5 both aspects of the Abbott Laboratories decision,
particularly the hardship aspect, provide a basis for understanding
the nature and degree of injury necessary to permit standing under
the APA.
The first factor supporting judicial review in Abbott Laborato-
ries was the fitness of the issue for review: the challenge raised a
question of pure statutory interpretation turning on congressional
intent." Similarly, most issues raised by challenges to Florida ad-
ministrative regulations, which arise under sections 120.54(4) and
120.56(1) of the Florida APA, present a purely legal question:
whether a proposed or enacted rule is an invalid exercise of the
abortion in the future. See Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Alice P., 367 So.
2d 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). On the other hand, of the subgroup of that class who cannot,
for medical reasons, take contraceptives, a substantial number may indeed want an abortion
in the future.
49. See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra.
50. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
51. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
52. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
53. 387 U.S. at 141.
54. Id. at 151.
55. See notes 56-61 and accompanying text infra.
56. 387 U.S. at 149.
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authority delegated by the legislature. Challenges to state adminis-
trative regulations, therefore, usually satisfy the first part of the
Abbott Laboratories justiciable controversy test."'
The second factor supporting judicial review in Abbott Labo-
ratories concerned the hardship to the parties that would result if
a court withheld review. The Court examined the finality and for-
mality of the administrative action, and the extent of its direct and
immediate impact on the challenger. In Florida, even if challenges
under sections 120.54(4) and 120.56(1) do not have to conform to
Abbott Laboratories's finality and formality standard, they still
must demonstrate sufficient injury to be reviewable under the Act.
A sufficient injury exists when the challenger is faced with an im-
mediate adverse impact, which is the heart of the Florida APA
"standing" doctrine.
In Abbott Laboratories, Justice Harlan emphasized that the
challenged regulation had a direct impact upon the day-to-day
business of the drug companies: "[T]he regulation is directed at
them in particular; it requires them to make significant changes in
their everyday business practices; if they fail to observe the Com-
missioner's rule they are quite clearly exposed to the imposition of
strong sanctions."58 The substantive nature of the regulation and
57. The Court's reluctance to become entangled in agency matters at an inappropriate
stage underlies Abbott Laboratories. As Justice Harlan said:
Without undertaking to survey the intricacies of the ripeness doctrine it is fair
to say that its basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of pre-
mature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over
administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interfer-
ence until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a
concrete way by the challenging parties.
387 U.S. at 148-49 (citing 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 116 (1948) and L.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 395 (1965)).
Although administrative, not judicial, review is immediately at issue in §§ 120.54(4) and
120.56, a hearing officer's determination that a rule or proposed rule is invalid constitutes
final agency action under §§ 120.56(5) and 120.54(4)(d). Final agency action is directly ap-
pealable to the district courts of appeal. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(1) (1981). Furthermore, as dis-
cussed at note 37 supra, although the precise separation of powers principles that govern
relationships between the branches of the federal government may not be fully binding on
such interbranch relationships at the state level, the general concept of undesirable interfer7
ence with the administrative process, rather than the means of that interference, still
controls.
58. 387 U.S. at 154. As Professor Vining stated:
Whenever an agency administering a comprehensive regulatory scheme
adopts an authoritative position on a question, the plans of persons and groups
active in the regulatory field are affected. Indeed, they are affected whenever the
agency acts to crystallize a question for authoritative resolution out of the flux of
problems being handled by those in the field. Plans must change, and this does
not mean change merely in expectations and paper calculations, in hopes and
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its immediate impact on the regulated companies' primary con-
duct, therefore, supported review.
In contrast, in a companion case to Abbott Laboratories, Toi-
let Goods Ass'n v. Gardner,8 9 the Court refused to allow preen-
forcement review of a regulation that governed the inspection of
manufacturing facilities because a particular inspection case was
not at issue. According to Justice Harlan, "This is not a situation
in which primary conduct is affected-when contracts must be ne-
gotiated, ingredients tested or substituted, or special records com-
piled. This regulation merely states that the Commissioner may
authorize inspectors to examine certain processes or formulae
.... ,,o The regulation challenged was a procedural rule that gov-
erned how an agency could enforce a presumably valid substantive
rule. The challenged regulation did not have the impact on pri-
mary behavior necessary to warrant review prior to enforcement.
The ripeness analysis used in Toilet Goods provides an in-
formative comparison to the standing rationale of Jerry. Like the
petitioners in Toilet Goods, the prisoner in Jerry challenged the
procedures used to enforce an otherwise valid substantive rule. In
both cases, as in O'Shea v. Littleton, there was an insufficient im-
pact on the challenger's everyday conduct to justify intrusion into
the administrative process.
To mount a challenge under the Florida APA after Jerry,
therefore, a litigant must show that he faces a concrete and imme-
diate injury that is caused by the challenged agency rule. Analogiz-
ing to federal administrative law principles, if the petitioner proves
he is within the class regulated by a particular substantive rule
that regulates primary conduct, and thus is substantially affected
by the rule, he should have standing under the APA. If, however,
the petitioner challenges a procedural rule, the requisite immediate
injury will probably not exist, although it is conceivable that some
onerous procedural rules could cause immediate injury. 1
fears. Purchasing and personnel training programs, research and product design,
financial arrangements, even organizational structures must be redirected to a
greater or lesser degree to accommodate or avoid the new fixed point.
Vining, supra note 15, at 1446.
59. 387 U.S. 158 (1967).
60. Id. at 164.
61. A possible example is procedures that fail to afford adequate due process. In fact,
the court in Jerry implied that an allegation labeling a rule unconstitutional might satisfy
the APA's standing requirements. 353 So. 2d at 1235. In Florida, however, administrative
agencies are not considered appropriate bodies to decide constitutional questions. The
proper procedure for instituting review of an allegedly unconstitutional rule is an action for
declaratory judgment in a circuit court under FLA. STAT. § 86 (1981). See, e.g., Metropolitan
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Under either the procedural-substantive analysis or the "in-
jury" test, official action that forces regulated persons to conform
immediately to substantive behavioral guidelines may be chal-
lenged under sections 120.54(4), 120.56(1), or 120.57 of the Florida
Statutes.2 Later cases indicate three general substantive areas into
which this official conduct falls: (1) entitlements to obtain or com-
pete for benefits publicly conferred upon certain beneficiaries; (2)
interests arising from substantive grants under statutes or agency
regulations; and (3) rights under contract or property principles.
IV. INJURIES RECOGNIZED AS SUFFICIENT FOR STANDING UNDER
THE APA.
A. Publicly Conferred Benefits Accruing to Individuals or
Groups
Agency administration of publicly created opportunities has
generated many challenges under the Florida APA. In Department
of Administration v. Harvey," for example, an applicant was in-
formed that she was ineligible for Division of Personnel employ-
ment because she failed to meet the department's minimum train-
Dade County v. Department of Commerce, 365 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). See also
Swan, Administrative Adjudication of Constitutional Questions: Confusion in Florida Law
and a Dying Misconception in Federal Law, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 527 (1979).
Professor Swan, of the University of Miami School of Law, suggested an alternative to
the general standing analysis in a class lecture:
Any facial "preenforcement" attack on an existing or proposed substantive or procedu-
ral rule may have a broad stare decisis effect on a group of people similarly situated to the
petitioner. If the petitioner will adequately represent that group, the focus of analysis for
standing purposes should properly be the interests of the group. Arguably, the legislature, in
providing for preenforcement review of rules, thought of protecting the general group of
persons possibly affected by the rules.
Thus, the standing test might (1) start with those interests relied on by the individual
petitioner to establish the probability of his future encounter with the challenged rule, and
then (2) determine the probability of that future encounter by reference to the characteris-
tics and propensities of the group that shares the petitioner's asserted interests (i.e., those
characteristics indistinguishable from the individual petitioner). In other words, the test
would define a group and then determine the probability of the petitioner's future encoun-
ter with the rule by reference to the nature of the group's business, or its personal charac-
teristics, or the dynamics of the institution that make it a group.
For example, of all the firms engaged in bidding on public works, a substantial number
will probably bid on future projects and encounter a minimum wage determination. See
notes 67-71 and accompanying text infra. Also, a substantial number of the applicants who
have been denied civil service jobs because they did not meet minimum qualifications might
apply again for similar civil service positions. See notes 63-66 and accompanying text infra.
62. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(4), .56(1)-.57 (1981).
63. 356 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
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ing and experience requirements."' The applicant challenged the
validity of the requirements under section 120.56 of the Florida
Statutes, 5 alleging that the agency's regulation deprived her of the
substantive right to compete for state employment. She also al-
leged that although the agency requirement had the effect of a
rule, the agency had not adopted the requirement in rulemaking
proceedings. In finding that the applicant had standing to chal-
lenge the rule, the District Court of Appeal, First District, ruled
that "the denial of avenues of employment substantially affected"
the petitioner."
In Department of Commerce v. Matthews Corp.," an unsuc-
cessful bidder on a public construction project contested the valid-
ity of department wage rate guidelines under section 120.56 of the
Florida Statutes." The bidder alleged that the wage rate guidelines
were rules, but were not adopted in accordance with the require-
ments of section 120.54.69 Although the petitioner had not been the
low bidder, and had not received the contract, the First District
upheld the hearing examiner's ruling that the petitioner had
standing. "[I]f it were not for the wage rate determinations," the
court stated, "Matthews would be in better competitive position to
bid on public works projects." 70 The court contrasted the bidder's
situation to that of the petitioner in Jerry, who "had not shown
either injury in fact or issues of sufficient immediacy and reality
necessary to confer standing.
7 1
64. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE Rule 22A-7.02(9) (1981).
65. FLA. STAT. § 120.56 (1981).
66. 356 So. 2d at 325.
67. 358 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
68. FLA. STAT. § 120.56 (1981).
69. Id. § 120.54.
70. 358 So. 2d at 257 n.1. The wage rate guidelines substantially affected Matthews
Corp., although perhaps not for the reason the court cited. Because the guidelines applied to
specific projects at particular locations, id. at 258, all bidders on a particular project would
be subject to the same guidelines. Thus, it is difficult to discern how the wage rate determi-
nations placed Matthews Corp. in a worse "competitive position to bid on public works
projects" vis-a-vis other bidders for the same project. Nevertheless, the application of the
guidelines would raise the cost of any bid, and thereby affect contractors' interests.
71. 358 So. 2d at 257 n.1. The court held that the guidelines were not rules subject to a
§ 120.54 challenge, because they were limited both temporally and geographically, and were
not generally applicable. Id. at 258. Nevertheless, because the wage determinations for a
particular project were mandatory and thus affected the substantial interests of contractors
and contracting authorities, the court subjected the guidelines to the hearing requirements
of § 120.57. Id. at 259.
The court's holding strongly suggests that the injury requirements for standing under
§§ 120.57 and 120.56 (and therefore § 120.54(4)) are coextensive. Significant differences may
exist in the procedures following the hearing, but this apparently is irrelevant in triggering
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The First District's opinion in Department of Health & Reha-
bilitative Services v. Alice P.71 applied the standing principles ar-
ticulated in Jerry to a class action rule challenge. In Alice P., the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, which adminis-
ters the Medicaid program in Florida, had issued a notice of pro-
posed amendments to its permanent rules, and had promulgated
emergency rules, to conform to a federal amendment that termi-
nated federal Medicaid funds for elective, nontherapeutic abor-
tions .7 Several Medicaid recipients, two women's health organiza-
tions, and the physician in charge of a women's health clinic
petitioned for a section 120.54(4) determination that the proposed
amendments improperly impounded funds appropriated by the
Florida Legislature, and that the notice summarizing the estimate
of economic impact was erroneous. After holding that "a proposed
rule challenge is not, under Florida law, a proper proceeding for
the maintenance of a class action," the First District considered
the standing of the individual petitioners .7  The court found that
the only Medicaid recipients who were "substantially affected" by
the proposed rules, and thus met the threshold standing test of
Jerry, were those women pregnant at the time of the challenge. 5
The director of the abortion clinic, also had standing because thir-
teen percent of the abortions performed at the clinic during his
four and one-half years tenure as director had been funded by
Medicaid. After the funding cutoff, the number of Medicaid pa-
tients patronizing the clinic significantly decreased. 6 Although the
court ultimately held that the petitioners who satisfied the thresh-
old requirements still could not sue because they did not file their
petitions within the statutory period 77 the court's opinion recog-
nized that persons threatened by a reduction of public benefits are
"substantially affected."
A central factor in the court's standing analysis in Alice P. was
its application of Jerry to determine which petitioners were suffi-
ciently affected to challenge the rule. The court rejected as "clearly
the initial procedural relief. See discussion at note 27 supra.
72. 367 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
73. Id. at 1048.
74. Id. at 1050.
75. Id. at 1052 & nn.1 & 2 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
76. Id. at 1052. The court found nothing in the record to support a finding of standing
for the two women's health organizations.
77. Id. at 1052-53. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4)(b) (1981) requires petitioners challenging pro-




erroneous" the hearing officer's finding "that all women of
childbearing age who are Medicaid recipients are substantially af-
fected."78 Just as Jerry lacked standing "to challenge a rule even




it would be inconsistent to grant standing to all Medicaid recipi-
ents of childbearing age, whether or not they are presently "di-
rectly affected" by the rule-i.e., pregnant."
In Panama City v. Public Employee Relations Commission,81
the DOAH found that Panama City had standing to bring a sec-
tion 120.56(1) 82 challenge to a state Public Employee Relations
Commission (PERC) order. The order threatened to revoke state
approval of the city's "local option" ordinance88 unless the city
amended its ordinance within ninety days. The "immediate and
real" order had "continuing present adverse effects upon [the city]
as a result of the state's threat to revoke approval of the local op-
tion ordinance should [the city] fail to comply with the order.
'84
Panama City is an example of a dispute involving public bene-
fits to a specified beneficiary, in which the alleged injury had the
78. 367 So. 2d at 1051. The court noted that "the hearing officer stated that he was not
concerned with the technicalities of standing but was 'interested in reaching the merits in
this case.'" Id. at 1049.
79. Id. at 1051.
80. Alice P. clarified the principles governing access to Florida APA procedures. The
rule challenged in Alice P. was not "procedural" in the same sense as the rule challenged in
Jerry. Indeed, it was substantive to the extent it determined what class of persons would be
eligible for a particular public benefit. But it is difficult to classify the abortion entitlement
as bearing significantly on the primary conduct of all women. Although many women would
adopt a different mode of behavior if federally funded abortions were available, such a
choice does not pose the same inevitability of changed conduct as in Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). See text accompanying note 58 supra. As a practidal matter,
the proposed rule change in Alice P. might cause nonpregnant Medicaid recipients to use an
alternative method of birth control. On the other hand, the pregnant Medicaid recipients
who would be excluded from benefits under the proposal would be compelled to carry an
"unwanted" child to term, obtain a professional abortion at significantly greater expense, or
abort in some less costly manner, clearly a choice of a different magnitude.
81. 1980 FLA. ADMIN. L. REP. 1193-A (Case No. 79-1369R) (Sept. 22, 1980).
82. FLA. STAT. § 120.56(1) (1981).
83. Pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 447.603 (1981), local governments may create a local com-
mission to govern labor disputes between public employers and employees in lieu of the
state PERC.
84. 1980 FLA. ADMIN. L. REP. at 1194-A. The opinion restated the Jerry test:
[T]he concept of standing in an administrative proceeding includes the notion
that Petitioner has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of the challenged rule, that Petitioner must show an
injury which is accompanied by continuing present adverse effects, and by the
notion that the substantial effect must be of sufficient immediacy and reality
and not illusory speculation.
Id. at 1193-A.
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immediacy that was lacking in Jerry. In Panama City, PERC's ac-
tion threatened to force the city to change its local law-its "pri-
mary behavior"-or face a sanction for failure to comply. The city
suffered the kind of "immediate impact" contemplated by the
standing doctrine articulated in Jerry.
Similarly, in Groves v. Department of Transportation,8 the
DOAH ruled that the petitioning state employees, who were sub-
ject to department layoffs, had standing to challenge the agency's
designation of a "competitive area." A competitive area represents
the divisions in which an employee who holds an eliminated posi-
tion can elect to replace an employee with fewer retention points
at the same or a lower job classification. The DOAH found that the
employees were "clearly substantailly [sic] affected by the designa-
tion of the competitive area" 86 because the number of available di-
visions directly affected their ability to retain or transfer to a job.
Furthermore, it required little speculation to assume that dis-
charged employees holding eliminated positions would exercise
their seniority rights and thereby be affected by the rule.
The employees had also challenged the date selected by the
department as a deadline for updating the retention point list. The
DOAH hearing officer found, however, that the employees lacked
standing to challenge this determination because "[i]t is just as
possible that choosing the . . . date was advantageous to the [em-
ployees] as is the contrary. ' 87 Under the Jerry standard, the em-
ployees lacked the requisite immediate injury. The DOAH hearing
officer concluded, therefore, that sections 120.56(1) and 120.54(4)
implicitly require that petitioners be "adversely" affected by the
challenged agency action. The concept of "injury" engrafted onto
these sections by Jerry implies an "adverse effect." 88
85. 1980 FLA. ADMIN. L. REP. 1513-A (Case No. 80-1690R) (Dec. 1, 1980).
86. Id. at 1514-A. After finding that the petitioners had standing to challenge the De-
partment's designation of the competitive area, the hearing officer held that the designation
did not constitute a "rule," and that the petition should be dismissed. Id. at 1515-A.
87. Id. at 1514-A.
88. For example, in Florida State Univ. v. Dann, 400 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981),
seven members of the university faculty brought an action challenging the issuance of a
document that set forth the university procedures for awarding merit salaries and other pay
increases. The complaint alleged that the document was not issued in a § 120.54 rulemaking
process, and thus constituted an invalid rule. The District Court of Appeal, First District,
held that the faculty members had standing to bring the challenge because the procedures
"were likely to have a continuing impact on determination of their annual salaries." Id. at
1305.
The DOAH recently denied standing in another case after finding that no continuing
impact existed. In Serrano v. Valencia Community College, 1981 FLA. ADMIN. L. REP. 2334-A
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A recent DOAH decision indicates that to be "substantially
affected" by agency action, a litigant must show that the remedy
sought will adequately redress the "effect" that gives rise to the
challenge. In Kiley v. Leon County School Board,89 a public school
student challenged a county-wide compulsory school attendance
rule,90 which required the school board to fail students with too
many unexcused absences. The student had failed the fall semester
of her freshman year because of her unexcused absences and poor
academic performance. She did not challenge the rule, however,
until two years later, after she had satisfactorily progressed in an-
other school. The hearing officer concluded that "a determination
of the challenged rule's invalidity necessarily could not return her
to the position she occupied" two years earlier; thus the rule no
longer "substantially affected" her.9 1
In Couch Construction Co. v. Department of Transporta-
tion,92 a case involving private beneficiaries of public grants that
arose under section 120.57 of the Florida Statutes,"3 the court held
that bidders on public contracts have standing to invoke a hearing
to challenge the qualifications of other bidders. The court ap-
proved the hearing officer's ruling that the "right of a bidder for a
public contract to a fair consideration of his bid and his right to an
award of the contract if his is the lowest responsible bid are mat-
ters of substantial interest to him, thus entitling him to a hearing
pursuant to § 120.57."' 4  I
(Case No. 81-2055R) (Nov. 5, 1981), an applicant who was denied either of two vacant
teaching positions challenged, under § 120.56, the college's procedural rules governing griev-
ance proceedings. Although the applicant had unsuccessfully pursued grievance proceedings
after the university denied his application, the applicant had no grievance pending when he
filed his APA petition. Citing Jerry, the hearing officer ruled that the petitioner "failed to
establish that he is suffering any continuing injury as a result of the procedural rules," and
dismissed the petition for lack of standing. Id. at 2335-A.
89. 1981 FLA. ADMIN. L. REP. 2245-A (Case No. 80-1611R) (June 8, 1981).
90. Leon County School Board, Rule 66X37-3.03 (1981).
91. 1981 FLA. ADMIN. L. REP. at 2447-A.
92. 361 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
93. FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (1981).
94. 361 So. 2d at 186. There is a reasonable inference that the court in Couch based its
grant of standing on an implied statutory right. See generally notes 123-64 and accompany-
ing text infra. The petitioner's complaint alleged that the low bidder was disqualified under
FLA. STAT. § 337.16(1) (1981), which provides: "(1) No contractor shall be qualified to bid
when an investigation by the highway engineer discloses that such contractor is delinquent
on a previously awarded contract, and in such case his certificate of qualification shall be
suspended or revoked." Id., quoted in 361 So. 2d at 186 n.2. But the court did not suggest
that standing springs from the substantive command of the statute. The court's holding
thus coincides with the general principle of this section: official actions affecting access to
"public goods" creates standing.
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B. Interests Created by Statute or Agency Rule
Substantive statutes and departmental rules may also entitle
persons to the benefits of the Florida APA's procedures for chal-
lenging agency action. Some statutes and rules expressly create
"substantial" interests,"' while others create interests that courts
have inferred will be "substantially affected" by agency action."
1. AGENCY RULES CONFERRING STANDING
Gadsden State Bank v. Lewis9 7 illustrates the extent to which
agency rules can establish a person's right to participate in or de-
mand a section 120.57 hearing. In Gadsden, the Department of
Banking and Finance denied the Gadsden State Bank's (Gadsden)
petition for a section 120.57(1) hearing to protest another bank's
application for authority to establish a branch near Gadsden's ex-
isting facility. The department ruled that Gadsden was neither a
party to the competitor's branch application nor a person whose
substantial interests would be determined by the department's
action."8
The District Court of Appeal, First District, reversed, ruling
that Gadsden was a "party" because a department rule defined
"parties to proceedings before the department" to include "com-
plainants" and "protestants."" The court then found that because
of the potential competitive injury to Gadsden, the agency pro-
ceedings on the competitor bank's branch application would deter-
mine Gadsden's "substantial interests." Although potential com-
petitive injury was not a matter of explicit statutory concern,'"0
another department rule conditioned branch approval on a finding
95. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 381.494(7)(b)-(e) (1981). See also The Florida Environmental
Protection Act of 1971, FLA. STAT. § 403.412(5) (1981).
96. See notes 123-64 and accompanying text infra.
97. 348 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
98. Id. at 346.
99. FLA. ADMIN. CODE Rule 3-2.20 (1981) provides: "Parties to proceedings before the
department are designated as applicants, petitioners, complainants, defendants, respon-
dents, protestants, or intervenors, according to the nature of the proceeding and the rela-
tionship of the respective parties."
The court noted that another rule designates opponents of an application as "protes-
tants," FLA. ADMIN. CODE Rule 3-2.26 (1981), and still another authorizes protestants to
make appearances and present evidence and argument at formal hearings, FLA. ADMIN. Con
Rule 3-3.73(2)(a)(4) (1981). 348 So. 2d at 346.
100. FLA. STAT. § 659.06(1)(a)(1) (Supp. 1976) (current version at FLA. STAT. §
658.26(2)(a) (1981)) authorized the Department of Banking and Finance to approve the es-
tablishment of branches "upon such conditions as the department shall prescribe, including
a satisfactory showing . . . that public convenience and necessity will be served thereby."
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"that local conditions assure reasonable promise of successful oper-
ation for the proposed branch 'and for the existing banks or
branches already established in such area.' "101 The department's
rule thus made the potential competitive injury a matter of statu-
tory concern, creating a substantial interest for purposes of section
120.57.102
A recent decision by the District Court of Appeal, Second Dis-
trict, demonstrates that the scope and purpose of a statute may
also limit the extent to which the enforcing agency's rules can con-
fer party status. In Agrico Chemicals Co. v. Department of Envi-
ronmental Regulation,103 a phosphate producer (Agrico) applied to
the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) for a con-
struction permit to build a terminal facility to handle solid
sulphur. Agrico needed a permit under section 403.807 of the Flor-
ida Statutes04 because the proposed facility posed a potential air
and water pollution hazard. Two molten sulphur suppliers, who
would be threatened economically by competition from Agrico,
subsequently petitioned for a section 120.57 hearing to challenge
Agrico's application. The suppliers argued that the DER's "Latest
Reasonably Available Control Technology" (LRACT) rule,105
which required the DER to give "due consideration to. . . the so-
cial and economic impact of the application of [proposed pollution
101. FLA. ADMIN. CODE Rule 3C-13.07(l)(e) (1977) (current version at FLA. ADMIN. CODE
Rule 3C-13.041 (1981)), quoted in 348 So. 2d at 346. In Carrollwood State Bank v. Lewis,
362 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), a bank located across the street from the site of a
proposed branch had standing to request a § 120.57 hearing to argue that local conditions
did not ensure the successful operation of existing banks in the area, much less the proposed
branch bank. The position taken by the Department of Banking and Finance, that the bank
"had no standing and was not a proper party or a person whose substantial interests were
determined by the agency, was untenable." Id. at 113.
102. A second, apparently independent basis that entitled Gadsden to demand a §
120.57(1) hearing was the statutory language: "[A] protesting party's right of participation
in an APA hearing does not depend on showing its own substantial interests are to be deter-
mined. Section 120.57 provides a hearing under one of its subsections 'in all proceedings in
which the substantial interest of a party are determined.'" 348 So. 2d at 346 (quoting FLA.
STAT. § 120.57 (Supp. 1976) (subsequent amendments do not affect cited section) (emphasis
added by the court)). The court noted that Gadsden's competitor "assuredly was such a
party." 348 So. 2d at 346. Thus, a person that can acquire party status under an agency rule
arguably has a right to a § 120.57 hearing if the challenged agency action will determine the
substantial interest of any other "party." See also Bio-Medical Applications v. Department
of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 374 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); text accompanying
notes 113-15 infra. This rationale arguably undercuts the meaningfulness of the "substantial
interest" requirement.
103. 406 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
104. FLA. STAT. § 403.087 (1977) (amended 1978).
105. FLA. ADMIN. CODE Rule 17-2.03 (1981).
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control] technology," made potential economic injury a proper
matter of DER concern, and thus conferred "party" status", on
business competitors under section 120.52(10)(b) of the Florida
APA. 10 7 The DER agreed that the LRACT rule gave the suppliers
standing and denied Agrico's application for a permit.108
On appeal, the Second District rejected the argument that the
LRACT Rule gave the suppliers standing to challenge Agrico's per-
mit applications solely on the basis of competitive economic injury.
The court concluded that "[t]he LRACT Rule, read in the context
of DER's statutory framework," is concerned with the cost to busi-
nesses of conforming their technology to new environmental tech-
nology, not with possible economic losses to a business competi-
tor.109 The court thus limited an agency's discretion to confer party
status by requiring that the allegedly injured interest have a direct
relationship to the interest protected by the underlying statutory
framework." 0
2. EXPRESS STATUTORY GRANTS OF STANDING
Some statutes expressly grant a substantive right to the APA's
procedures. Section 381.494(7)(e) of the Florida Statutes,"' for ex-
ample, allows "[a]n applicant, a substantially affected person, or a
health systems agency aggrieved by the issuance, revocation, or de-
nial of a certificate of need [for a health care facility] . . . to seek
relief according to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act.""' 2 In Bio-Medical Applications v. Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Services,"3 an unsuccessful applicant for a certifi-
cate of need authorizing a dialysis facility petitioned for a section
120.57 hearing to challenge the simultaneous grant of such a certif-
106. Id. Rule 17-2.03(l)(d), quoted in 406 So. 2d at 480 n.1 (emphasis supplied by
court). The DER granted the challengers' standing on this basis. The DER took the position
that "while competitive economic injury is not sufficient to confer standing to seek a section
120.57 hearing in a chapter 403 permitting procedure, the LRACT Rule makes competitive
economic injury a matter of agency concern and confers standing on Freeport and Sulphur
Terminals pursuant to section 120.52(10)(b), Florida Statutes." 406 So. 2d at 481. The DER
claimed it could grant standing within its discretion "even though its final decision to issue
or deny a permit may not be based on the economic effect on an applicant's competitor."
107. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(10)(b) (1981).
108. 406 So. 2d at 482-83.
109. Id. at 482.
110. Id. at 483; see FLA. STAT. § 120.52(10)(b) (1981). See also notes 140-44, 158-64 and
accompanying text infra.
111. FLA. STAT. § 381.494(7)(e) (1981).
112. Id.
113. 374 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
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icate to a nearby hospital. The department denied the petition on
the ground that Bio-Medical lacked standing to contest its compet-
itor's application. Without discussing the broad "any applicant"
language of the statute, the District Court of Appeal, First District,
reversed and held that "when simultaneous applications are mutu-
ally exclusive and are so regarded by the Department, as here...,
each competitor is potentially a party to the proceedings on the
other's application. Each is one 'whose substantial interests will be
affected by proposed agency action' on the other's application."' 1 4
Because Bio-Medical had standing as a potential party to the pro-
ceedings on its competitor's application, "Bio-Medical was entitled
to request a hearing in those proceedings by which [the competi-
tor's] substantial interests were to be determined."' 1 5
The Florida Environmental Protection Act (EPA)" goes even
further than the statute at issue in Bio-Medical,"7 and permits
Florida citizens to file suit to enjoin violations of the environmen-
tal protection laws, rules, and regulations. 8 In Florida Wildlife
Federation v. Department of Environmental Regulation,"9 the
Supreme Court of Florida held that the EPA "created a new cause
of action, giving the citizens of Florida new substantive rights not
previously possessed."'' 0 Because the EPA expressly allowed pri-
vate suits, the Wildlife Federation had standing to sue without al-
leging a special injury, different in kind and degree from that suf-
fered by the public at large.' 2' A person alleging an injury by an
agency to a substantive right created by the EPA would also
114. Id. at 89 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 120.52(10)(b) (1981)). The court also ruled that
Bio-Medical's petition was timely: "[A]bsent Department rules giving Bio-Medical an earlier
clear point of entry as intervenor, Bio-Medical timely requested a hearing after the Depart-
ment acted on [one competitor's) application in free-form proceedings." 374 So. 2d at'88.
115. 374 So. 2d at 89 (citing FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (Supp. 1978) (amended 1979, 1980 &
1981) (amendments do not affect cited section) and Gadsden State Bank v. Lewis, 348 So.
2d 343, 346 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)); see note 102 supra.
116. FLA. STAT. § 403.412 (1981).
117. Id. § 381.494(7)(e).
118. Id. § 403.412(2)(a). Plaintiffs must file a complaint with the appropriate agency
before they can bring a court action for injunctive relief. Id. § 403.412(2)(c).
119. 390 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1980).
120. Id. at 66.
121. Id. at 67. The court noted:
We presume legislative awareness of the law of public nuisance with its special
injury requirement. That the legislature chose to allow citizens to bring an ac-
tion where an action already existed for those who had special injury persuades
us that the legislature did not intend that the special injury rule carry over to
suits brought under the EPA.
Id. FLA. STAT. § 192.091 (1981) arguably creates an interest in property appraisers and state
taxing authorities that would support standing for APA challenges. See note 142 infra.
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clearly have standing to challenge the agency action under the
Florida APA.1
22
3. IMPLIED STATUTORY GRANTS OF STANDING
Some substantive statutes create "substantial" interests by
implication rather than express provision; that is, courts some-
times infer that the beneficiaries of a statute's protection will be
"substantially affected" by action undertaken by an agency pursu-
ant to the statute. For example, chapter 380 of the Florida Stat-
utes, the state Environmental Land and Water Management
Act,123 is a substantive statute that establishes planning objectives
and procedures for the regulation of land use, and creates govern-
mental and quasi-governmental bodies to implement its provisions.
Various private parties and public bodies have attempted to assert
substantive interests supposedly created by chapter 380.
Private parties may challenge a developer's failure to comply
with the requirements of chapter 380, but only if they allege inju-
ries different in kind from those of the public generally. 1 2 In Pi-
nellas County v. Lake Padgett Pines2 5 a partnership alleged the
requisite special injury when it claimed that a county-approved
well field project on neighboring land would jeopardize its water
supply.126 The partnership thus had standing to maintain an action
to enjoin the project on the ground that the developer failed to
comply with the requirements of chapter 380.
A large part of the recent adjudication under chapter 380 has
involved third-party attempts to participate in proceedings to de-
termine whether a proposed development is a "development of re-
gional impact" (DRI). Section 380.06(1) defines a DRI as a devel-
opment that "would have a substantial effect on the health, safety,
or welfare of citizens of more than one county.' 21 7 Before a devel-
122. Obviously, the legislature may also restrict access to APA procedures. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 120.52(10) (1981). But cf. Hunter v. Department of Corrections, 390 So. 2d
1227, 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
123. FLA. STAT. ch. 380 (1980).
124. The rule that a private party must allege special injury to challenge another per-
son's violation of the law originated in the law of public nuisance. See, e.g., United States
Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974); Chabau v. Dade County, 385
So. 2d 129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Askew v. Hold the Bulkhead-Save Our Bay, Inc., 269 So.
2d 696 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972); Sarasota Anglers Club, Inc. v. Burns, 193 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1967).
125. 333 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). Lake Padgett Pines discussed standing to sue
for an injunction, not standing under the APA.
126. Id. at 475.
127. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(1) (1981).
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oper may undertake a DRI, he must first obtain the approval of
the appropriate agency or local government.12 Although section
380.06 provides general guidelines for classifying property as a
DRI, a developer in doubt may request the state land planning
agency to issue a binding letter of interpretation concerning the
status of the proposed development. 2' To ensure certainty,
"[b]inding letters of interpretation issued by the state land plan-
ning agency shall bind all state, regional, and local agencies, as well
as the developer."1 '
The Florida district courts of appeal have firmly established
that regional planning councils do not have standing to participate
as formal parties in binding letter proceedings. In South Florida
Regional Planning Commission v. Division of State Planning,3
the District Court of Appeal, First District, denied the regional
planning council's petition for a formal hearing under section
120.57(1) to challenge the state planning agency's finding that a
proposed development was not a DRI. The court held that section
380.06(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes3 2 "in no way provides for the
involvement of the regional planning council in the binding letter
process; and there is no other provision of the statute that in any
way provides a basis for the Council's contention that it is entitled
to participate in binding letter determinations.
1 383
Similarly, a regional planning council is not a "party" to bind-
ing letter proceedings under section 120.52(10) of the Florida Stat-
utes.34 Reading chapter 380 together with section 120.52(10), the
District Court of Appeal, Third District, has opined that any "sub-
stantial interest" of a regional planning council is fully represented
by the state agency. Because a regional council "lacks a substantial
interest which is not otherwise represented" by the state agency, it
is not a "party" under chapter 120.135
The district courts of appeal have also held that "third per-
sons have no enforceable right of their own volition to participate
128. Id. § 380.06(5).
129. Id. § 380.06(4)(a).
130. Id.; see South Florida Regional Planning Council v. Division of State Planning,
370 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). See also South Florida Regional Planning Council v.
Land & Water Adjudicatory Comm'n, 372 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
131. 370 So. 2d at 447.
132. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(4)(a) (1981).
133. 370 So. 2d at 449.
134. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(10) (1981).
135. South Florida Regional Planning Council v. Land & Water Adjudicatory Comm'n,
372 So. 2d 159, 167 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (alternative holding).
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as formal parties in binding letter proceedings. 1 6 In Suwannee
River Area Boy Scouts of America v. Department of Community
Affairs,"8 7 the District Court of Appeal, First District, noted that
the regional impact concept of chapter 380 concerns "matters af-
fecting the public in general, not special interests of adjoining
landowners."' 8s Thus, the interests of particular groups should be
brought before the "local governing body having jurisdiction to
control land use and development under zoning and building
regulations."139
The court in Suwannee addressed, but specifically declined to
decide, whether the Department of Community Affairs could enact
a rule permitting third parties to request a formal section 120.57(1)
hearing.'4 0 Gadsden State Bank v. Lewis'4 ' would seem to suggest
that the Department had the authority to do so, because the court
in Gadsden granted standing on the basis of an agency rule. But in
Gadsden the interests recognized by the rule were consistent with
the underlying statutory scheme. In Suwannee, on the other hand,
the court specifically noted that chapter 380 addresses the public's
interest in DRIs, not the interests of particular neighbors. 14 Fur-
thermore, "the proceeding in Gadsden was required by law as the
final step in the licensing or permitting process."' 4 3 In contrast, ad-
ditional proceedings that would delay the binding letter process
could defeat the purpose of the statutory scheme, because develop-
ers "would be more reluctant to voluntarily subject themselves to
the additional delay and expense entailed in securing a binding
letter."
44
In Peterson v. Department of Community Affairs,'4 the First
District again held that third parties do not have a substantial in-
terest in the issuance of a binding letter, and thus have no right to
136. See, e.g., Suwannee River Area Boy Scouts of Am. v. Department of Community
Affairs, 384 So. 2d 1369, 1373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
137. 384 So. 2d 1369 (1st DCA 1980).
138. Id. at 1374.
139. Id. (emphasis added). The court noted that chapter 380 encourages local control of
land use and development. Id. at 1374 n.3.
140. Id. at 1373. Under the Department's rules, only developers may request a formal
section 120.57(1) hearing. FLA. ADMIN. CODs Rule 22F-1.16(12) (1981).
141. 348 So. 2d at 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); see text accompanying notes 96-101 supra.
142. 384 So.' 2d at 1374. Agrico Chemical Co. v. Department of Envt'l Regulation, 406
So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), concurs on this point. See discussion at text accompanying
notes 103-09 supra.
143. 384 So. 2d at 1374.
144. Id.
145. 386 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
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request a section 120.57(1) hearing. The court first stated that sec-
tion 380.06(4)(a) did not grant the petitioners, who were neighbor-
ing landowners, party status. Specifically, the petitioners failed to
show that classifying the project as a DRI would affect their prop-
erty differently than a finding that the project was not a DRI. The
petitioners thus raised only the possibility that some speculative
injury might result from construction of the proposed project.""
Because a binding letter is neither a permit nor a license to begin
construction, and only determines whether or not a proposed de-
velopment is a DRI, it does not sufficiently affect a neighboring
landowner's interests to confer standing for an APA challenge.1
4 7
Standing issues also frequently arise in APA challenges to
school board boundary determinations. In School Board v. Black-
ford, 148 the District Court of Appeal, First District, held that a
boundary change that required children to attend a school farther
from their homes did not "substantially affect" the children under
the rule of Florida Department of Offender Rehabilitation v.
Jerry."9 In deciding that the children and their parents did not
have standing to bring a section 120.56 rule challenge, the court
noted that the petitioners did not show any disparity in the educa-
tional opportunities offered at the two schools. 5 °
In McGill v. School Board,'5 1 the petitioners did make the
necessary showing. In that case the Division of Administrative
Hearings held that parents and their school-age children, who
would be transferred to educationally inferior schools under pro-
posed school board rules, had standing to challenge the proposed
rules under section 120.54(4). After limiting Blackford to its
facts, 52 the hearing officer in McGill used the substantive statute
governing the school board's authority to give content to the defi-
nition of "party" in section 120.52(10)(b) of the Florida Statutes. 55
Section 120.52(10)(b) defines a "party" as any person "'who, as a
matter of constitutional right, provision of statute, or provision of
agency regulation, is entitled to participate in whole or in part in
146. Id. at 881.
147. Id. at 880.
148. 369 So.' 2d 689 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
149. Id. at 691 (citing Jerry, 353 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)).
150. 369 So. 2d at 690.
151. 1980 FLA. ADMIN. L. REP. 995-A (Case No. 80-775R) (Aug. 11, 1980).
152. For example, the school board decision challenged in Blackford was not discretion-
ary; it was mandated by a federal court order. In McGill, the school board rezoned to reduce
overcrowding and eliminate underutilization of elementary schools. Id. at 998-A.
153. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(10)(b) (1981).
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the proceeding, or whose substantial interest will be affected
... 9"15 Section 230.232(2) of the Florida Statutes " ' created a
duty on the part of school boards to consider parents' interests.
The hearing officer found that the statute
requires that in the course of setting school attendance zones
".. . there shall be taken into consideration the request or con-
sent of the parent or guardian or the person standing in loco
parentis to the pupil. . . ." Thus, the interests of parents, and
through them, their school-age children, must be considered by
[the school board] in the context of any proposed changes of
school attendance zones.15"
McGill thus found that the statute created a substantive interest
that could be substantially affected by agency action.
To obtain standing by implication from a statutorily created
right, a petitioner must demonstrate a direct relationship between
the interest allegedly injured and the substantive purpose of the
statute.1 57 Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Department of Highway Safety
& Motor Vehicles,1" describes the nexus that is necessary to infer
a substantive interest from a statutory scheme. In Yamaha, the
national Yamaha importer and distributor challenged the validity
of a Department rule permitting existing, licensed automobile
dealers to protest in licensing proceedings initiated by prospective
dealers.1" Specifically, the rule requires the agency to notify li-
censed dealers of "the same make or makes of vehicles in the terri-
tory or community in which the new dealership proposed to lo-
cate," and give "them and all real parties in interest an
opportunity to be heard." 10 The Department promulgated the rule
pursuant to chapter 320 of the Florida Statutes,' which estab-
lishes certain business qualifications that applicants must satisfy
to obtain an automobile dealership license.6 2
The challenged rule's express grant of standing to existing
dealers to protest a prospective competitor's licensing application
154. 1980 FLA. ADMIN. L. REP. at 997-A (quoting FLA. STAT. § 120.52(10)(b)) (emphasis
supplied by hearing officer).
155. FLA. STAT. § 230.232(2) (1979) (repealed 1980).
156. 1980 FLA. ADMIN. L. REP. at 997-A (quoting FLA. STAT. § 230.232(2) (1979) (re-
pealed 1980)).
157. See notes 109-10, 140-44 and accompanying text supra.
158. 1981 FLA. ADMIN. L. REP. 1724-A (Case No. 81-1619R) (Aug. 13, 1981).
159. FLA. ADMIN. CODE Rule 15C-1.08.
160. Id.
161. FLA. STAT. ch. 320 (1981).
162. Id. §§ 320.27-.70.
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is consistent with the purpose of chapter 320. Section 320.642, for
example, requires the Department to deny a license application
when existing dealerships "have complied with [their] agreements
and are providing adequate representation in the community or
territory."' 3 The statutory and regulatory schemes do not, how-
ever, directly address the interests of a national distributor-
franchisor, even though the statute indirectly affects a franchisor's
ability to sell franchises. Therefore, the hearing officer held that
Yamaha lacked standing to challenge the rule under section 120.56
because it "failed to demonstrate that [it] has sustained injury or
is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury" because of
the rule.'6 4
C. Interference with Traditional Property or Contract Rights
Under section 120.57 of the Florida Statutes, an aggrieved
party will have standing to seek a formal hearing if a factual dis-
pute in an administrative proceeding requires resolution of the
party's "substantial" property or contract rights.'"
The Department of Education has concluded that a party may
not demand a section 120.57 hearing unless the Department's ac-
163. Id. § 320.642.
164. 1981 FLA. ADMIN. L. REP. at 1726-A (citing Jerry, 353 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA
1978)). A franchisee whose license application was being protested by existing dealers had
originally joined Yamaha's rule challenge. Those dealers settled their dispute, however, and
thus foreclosed a full hearing on the validity of the rule.
165. A party's "special injuries" also fall within the penumbra of substantial rights or
interests. Parties possessing the requisite special injuries include persons allegedly victim-
ized by a public nuisance. See cases cited at note 124 supra. The special injury requirement
also applies in suits by taxpayers challenging tax statutes. "It has long been the rule in
Florida that, in the absence of a constitutional challenge, a taxpayer may bring suit only
upon a showing of special injury which is distinct." Department of Revenue v. Markham,
396 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 1981).
In Markham the Florida Supreme Court held that the Broward County property ap-
praiser did not have standing to bring a declaratory action to determine the inclusiveness or
wisdom of part of the former personal property tax law. The court applied the rule that "a
public official may only seek a declaratory judgment when he is 'willing to perform his du-
ties, but. . . prevented from doing so by others.'" Id. (quoting Reid v. Kirk, 257 So. 2d 3, 4
(Fla. 1972)). The court held that a public official may not challenge a statute he is obligated
to apply, without alleging a constitutional infirmity or qualifying as a specially injured
taxpayer.
A new statute may broaden the standing of taxing authorities and property appraisers
involving tax rolls and tax levies applicable to 1980 and subsequent years: "The property
appraiser or any taxing authority shall have the authority to bring and maintain such ac-
tions as may be necessary to contest the validity of any rule, regulation, order, directive, or
determination of any agency of the state .... " 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-274, § 6 (adding FLA.
STAT. § 195.092(2) (1981)). The court in Markham expressly withheld comment on the ap-
plicability of the new statute to suits such as the one before it. 396 So. 2d at 1121 n.1.
19811
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tions affect the party's property interests. In Equels v. Florida
State University, e6 a student challenged the propriety and legal-
tity of the University's grants of certain institutional fellowships,
because one-fourth of the grants went to minority applicants, some
of whom were "less qualified" or had "less need" than the
petitioner.
The Department dismissed the student's claim because he
failed to demonstrate that the University was contractually obli-
gated to grant him a fellowship; a contract would have vested in
the student a legally protectable property interest. 6 7 The Depart-
ment reasoned that the petitioner could not challenge the allot-
ment'of grants unless he would have received an award but for the
University's distribution scheme. Thus, because the student failed
to allege or prove a substantial contract or property interest, he
did not meet the threshold standing requirement of the APA.'"
In contrast, in Graham Contracting, Inc. v. Department of
General Services,'69 the petitioner demonstrated a substantial con-
tract right, even though the terms of the contract ostensibly re-
moved its claim from the ambit of APA control. The underlying
contract in Graham required the petitioner to construct a state of-
fice building, and directed the architect and the Department of
General Services to resolve all contractual disputes without satisfy-
ing the procedural requirements of section 120.57.170 After an un-
successful attempt to win time and cost concessions from the De-
partment, the petitioner appealed to the District Court of Appeal,
First District. The court accepted jurisdiction under section 120.68
and reversed,' 7' holding that the grievance procedures in the con-
tract required the Department to conduct more than a perfunctory
166. 1980 FLA. ADMIN. L. REP. 1205-A (Case No. 79-1621) (Sept. 22, 1980).
167. The Department rejected the student's claim also because administrative agencies
are not empowered to resolve constitutional disputes. Id. at 1207-A.
168. See Florida Dept. of Offender Rehabilitation v. Jerry, 353 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1978). The Department noted that all 211 other applicants, including the thirty
awarded fellowships, would be necessary and indispensable parties to any hearing. It con-
cluded that "the legislature intentionally omitted compulsory joinder of parties in adminis-
trative proceedings. Therefore, claims such as these which require compulsory joinder of
parties to fully examine all issues and adjudicate all interests have also been intentionally
excluded from being determined by an administrative proceeding." Id. at 1208-A. Although
many persons have pressed for standing by implication of substantive statutes, Equels
shows that standing may be denied by negative implication of the APA.
169. 363 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
170. Graham and the Department exchanged claims and orders, respectively, in a series
of informal letters. Id. at 813.
171. The court determined that the Department's orders constituted a final judgment,
thereby permitting judicial review. Id.
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review of the petitioner's claims.17 The court left little doubt that
a contractual right triggers agency review procedures: "[T]he De-
partment's contract . . . calls for agency action which potentially
affects Graham's substantial interests and thereby subjects the De-
partment's actions to Chapter 120 discipline and remedies.
' 178
V. THE PROBLEM OF ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING
In a series of Florida administrative law cases, representative
associations have brought actions under chapter 120 of the Florida
Statutes to pursue the substantial interests of their members. Con-
trary to the doctrine of associational standing that prevails in fed-
eral courts,1 74 Florida tribunals, until recently, have denied stand-
ing to associations whose members are not also parties to the
action.
1 75
172. Id. at 814.
173. Id. at 812. Of course, the formality of the hearing required would depend on the
existence of a material factual dispute. Id. at 815; see FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)-(2) (1981). The
district court also held that the APA represents a legislative waiver of state immunity in
qualified suits brought against a state agency for violations of contract rights.
174. See notes 182-96 and accompanying text infra.
175. There are two apparent exceptions to this general proposition. Florida courts have
granted organizations standing to bring suit without the participation of the individual
members: 1) when a substantive statute grants that organization the right to sue, or 2) when
a zoning ordinance is challenged as illegal and, therefore, void. The following two illustrative
cases are non-APA cases.
FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2) (1979) permitted associational standing in Florida Wildlife
Fed'n v. Department of Envt'l Regulation, 390 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1980). The statute provided
that state citizens could sue either to compel or to enjoin the activities of governmental
agencies regulated by the Environmental Protection Act. Following the dictates of FLA.
STAT. § 617.021 (1979), the court found that the Federation, like a natural citizen, has the
power to seek judicial enforcement of the Act's policy. 390 So. 2d at 68. The court found the
Federation a "citizen" because a different statute, FLA. STAT. § 617.021 (1979), "states that
nonprofit corporations have the power to sue and be sued to the same extent as natural
persons," and because it would be consistent with the Act's enforcement policy. 390 So. 2d
at 68.
Upper Keys Citizens Ass'n v. Wedel, 341 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), illustrates the
judicial willingness to allow an organization to challenge a zoning ordinance although its
members suffer no special injury. In Upper Keys, a nonprofit citizens group challenged a
county development order on the ground that the decision, made after discussions in a
closed meeting between the zoning board and a county commissioner, violated Florida's
"Sunshine Law." The court held that "any affected resident, citizen or property owner of
the governmental unit in question has standing to challenge an improperly enacted, and
thus void, ordinance without the necessity of showing special damages." Id. at 1064 (citing
Renard v. Dade County, 261 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1972)). See also Upper Keys Citizens Ass'n v.
Schloesser, 407 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Save Brickell Ave., Inc. v. City of Miami,
395 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). The broad standing granted in Wedel reflects a judi-
cially created exception to the special injury rule. See Renard v. Dade County, 261 So. 2d
832 (Fla. 1972). The special injury rule was judicially created for the purpose of "forestalling
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In Florida Department of Education v. Florida Education As-
sociation/United (FEA/United),'176 a confederation of bargaining
units representing approximately 30,000 of the state's 90,000
teachers challenged Department of Education procedures gov-
erning the revocation or suspension of teaching certificates. In a
section 120.56 proceeding, the DOAH invalidated a number of
these rules. The District Court of Appeal, First District, reversed
on the ground that the confederation lacked standing. Signifi-
cantly, no teacher was a party to the action. 17 Without a teacher
as a party, the association could not claim that it had suffered or
was in immediate danger of sustaining direct injury as a result of
the challenged rule. The court thus held that the confederation
was not a "substantially affected" person under Jerry.1
7 8
The First District followed the rule implied in its FEA/United
opinion-that an association does not have standing to challenge
the validity of a rule even though the rule affects its members-in
Department of Labor & Employment Security v. Florida Home
Builders.179 The Department of Labor had appealed a DOAH find-
ing that a Department rule constituted an invalid exercise of dele-
gated authority. The disputed rule in Home Builders, like the pro-
cedures examined in FEA/United, affected members of the
builders association by placing the builders at a competitive disad-
vantage. Nonetheless, the district court reversed because the asso-
ciation lacked standing under section 120.56: no builder was a
party to the action and, therefore, the builders' association was not
a substantially affected party.180
The Supreme Court of Florida recently quashed the district
court's decision in Home Builders, however, finally incorporating
associational standing into Florida's standing doctrine. The court
held that
a trade or professional association should be able to institute a
a multiplicity of suits." Florida Wildlife Fed'n. v. Department of Envt'l Regulation, 390 So.
2d at 67:
176. 378 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 894.
179. 392 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), quashed, 412 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1982).
180. 392 So. 2d at 22. In Florida Optometric Ass'n v. Department of Business Regula-
tion, 399 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), the court also denied an optometrist association the
right to file for a declaratory statement under § 120.56(5) as to the applicability of an
agency rule based upon a hypothetical set of facts allegedly existing as to some members.
The court held that the association lacked standing because those members "who may be
affected by the rule were not parties to the petition." Id.
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rule challenge under section 120.56 even though it is acting
solely as the representative of its members. To meet the require-
ments of section 120.56(1), an association must demonstrate
that a substantial number of its members, although not necessa-
rily a majority, are "substantially affected" by the challenged
rule. Further, the subject matter of the rule must be within the
association's general scope of interest and activity, and the relief
requested must be of the type appropriate for a trade associa-
tion to receive on behalf of its members.181
The Supreme court's decision in Home Builders aligns Florida
law with the federal decisions that conferred standing on tradi-
tional voluntary membership organizations to assert their mem-
bers' rights. 8 2 For example, in Warth v. Seldin,"'5 several individ-
uals and organizations, including the Rochester Home Builders
Association,184 challenged the constitutionality of the city's zoning
practices. The association claimed that the zoning restrictions
thwarted its members' business activities by preventing the con-
struction of low- and moderate-cost housing.' s5 The Supreme
Court of the United States affirmed the district court's dismissal of
the suit, holding that the petitioners in general,' 86 and the associa-
tion in particular, lacked standing to sue. The Court reasoned that
the association could not demonstrate that its members suffered
181. Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Department of Labor & Employment Security, 412
So. 2d 351, 353-54 (Fla. 1982).
Between the First District's decision in Home Builders and the Supreme Court's rever-
sal, the First District, may have been reconsidering its position in Professional Firefighters,
Inc. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 396 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981),
in which a firefighters' union and two of its members petitioned under § 120.56 to challenge
the agency's paramedic licensing requirements. The court found it unnecessary to determine
whether the union had satisfied the jurisdictional requirement established in FEAlUnited
because it ruled that the firefighters had standing under chapter 120; the union members
proved that the licensing regulations substantially affected their ability to earn a livelihood.
The authority of Professional Firefighters was somewhat tenuous because the firefighters,
unlike the teachers in FEAlUnited, were parties in the suit and were able to demonstrate a
quantifiable and deleterious effect of the disputed requirements. Id. at 1196; see notes 20-23
and accompanying text supra.
182. See 412 So. 2d at 353 & n.3.
183. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
184. Id. at 497-98. The Rochester Home Builders Association represented firms en-
gaged in residential construction in the Rochester metropolitan area.
185. Id. at 497.
186. The residents of Rochester failed to demonstrate a palpable economic injury. Id.
at 508. The city's taxpayers were also unsuccessful because they failed to establish a nexus
between their claims and the alleged injury sustained by low income families. Id. at 510,
513-14. Petitioner Housing Council, a nonprofit corporation interested in housing problems,
lacked standing because it failed to allege a "live" controversy. Id. at 517.
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any injury. 87 The nature of the relief sought by the builders' asso-
ciation also troubled the Court. Justice Powell explained that when
an association seeks declaratory, injunctive, "or some other form of
prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy
. . . will inure to the benefit of those members . . . actually in-
jured."' 8 In Warth, however, the association sought damages for
injuries to its members, who were not parties to the suit, when it
could not even meet its threshold burden of establishing their
injury.
The United States Supreme Court articulated an analytical
framework for resolving problems of associational standing in
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission.19 In
Hunt a North Carolina statute prevented out-of-state apple grow-
ers from displaying their state apple grades on the containers used
to ship their products into North Carolina. The Washington Apple
Commission, 90 an agency consisting of thirteen elected apple
growers and dealers, challenged the constitutionality of the statute.
The organization claimed that the North Carolina law limited its
access to local markets in a manner inconsistent with the princi-
ples underlying the commerce clause."' Ignoring the obvious eco-
nomic injury sustained by the apple dealers,"' North Carolina offi-
cials contended that the Washington Commission lacked the
necessary "personal stake" to assert the claims of its growers. The
Supreme Court refused, however, to separate the claims of the ap-
ple growers from those of the Commission, and affirmed the dis-
trict court's finding that the statute unconstitutionally discrimi-
nated against commerce."98 The Court found that the North
Carolina statute affected the Commission's growers and dealers to
the same extent as the class of growers and dealers that it repre-
sented. Chief Justice Burger noted that an association may bring
suit on behalf of its members if "(a) its members would otherwise
have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to
187. Like the petitioner in Equels, the association could not prove that the restrictive
zoning ordinance was the proximate cause of its members' injuries. Id. at 516.
188. Id. at 515.
189. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
190. Although the Washington Commission was not a traditional voluntary member-
ship organization, the Court classified it as a de facto traditional trade association represent-
ing the state's apple industry. Id. at 344.
191. Justice Cardozo explained in Baldwin v. Sellig, 294 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1935), that
the commerce clause is to be interpreted in a manner that prevents parochial interests from
inciting economic rivalries and reprisals among states.
192. 432 U.S. at 344.
193. Id. at 345.
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protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participa-
tion of individual members in the lawsuit."194
The associational standing doctrine established in Hunt allows
groups to sue for injunctive, declaratory, or some other form of
prospective relief, without joining individual members' damage
claims. The Florida Supreme Court's recent acceptance of this doc-
trine in Home Builders represents a well-reasoned application of
the federal doctrine to the Florida APA. After all, petitions for a
hearing under section 120.56(1) or 120.54(4) of the Florida Stat-
utes, which permit challenges to the validity of proposed or en-
acted regulations, seek the same type of prospective relief that the
petitioners sought in Warth.195 Furthermore, the petitions, like
their federal counterparts, present legal questions of statutory in-
terpretation to be resolved by administrative hearing officers.'"
Although Warth and Hunt involved constitutional questions,
their analysis is still relevant to petitions filed under the Florida
APA.1"7 In Jerry, for example, the court gave content to the words
"substantially affected" by looking to the injury required to meet
the "case or controversy" requirement of article 111.198 Of course,
grants of administrative relief under the Florida APA are not nec-
essarily construed as liberally as under federal doctrines. a9 None-
theless, the doctrine of associational standing is consistent with
both the legislative history and the purpose of the Florida APA. s00
194. Id. at 343.
195. See notes 176-78, 180 and accompanying text supra.
196. Whether the associational standing doctrine should also apply to FLA. STAT. §
120.57 hearings presents a more difficult question. Section 120.57 provides for adjudicatory
hearings, which require the resolution of factual disputes rather than purely legal questions
of statutory interpretation. Thus, the "prospective-relief-only" and the "nonindividual-fact"
elements underlying the federal associational standing doctrine are absent.
197. National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 372 U.S. 246 (1963), served
as the doctrinal basis for Warth and Hunt. National Motor involved an interpretation of §
1009(a) of the federal APA. This provision is similar to § 10(a) of the current APA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1976). Neither § 1009(a) nor § 702 expressly grants to groups the right to pursue APA
remedies. Yet the Court permitted associational standing because the association was the
carriers' proper representative and the alliance's members suffered injury. 372 U.S. at 247.
Justice Harlan concurred in the decision, but expressed concern because "the question
of 'standing' should not be decided without plenary consideration." 372 U.S. at 247.
198. See notes 33-44 and accompanying text supra.
199. For example, the delegation doctrine applies more strictly in state administrative
law than federal law. See W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 81 (7th
ed. 1979). The Florida courts invoke that doctine to ensure that the legislature does not
delegate authority without proper standards as it did in Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372
So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1979).
200. Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Department of Labor & Employment Security, 412
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The decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in Home Builders
faces the reality that people with common interests unite to pursue
common goals, and promotes the legislative purpose of expanding
public access to government agencies.
VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FINAL AGENCY ACTION
Section 120.68(1) of the Florida Statutes, provides that "[a]
party who is adversely affected by final agency action is entitled to
judicial review. '20 1 Section 120.52(10) defines "party" as follows:
So. 2d 351, 352-53 (1982). The concept discussed in this section should not be confused with
the question of neighborhood groups challenging zoning decisions, or of ideologically based
organizations maintaining lawsuits. In those cases, the standing problem exists because
neither the general membership nor the organization itself has suffered or is threatened with
the special injury necessary to gain standing. In zoning cases, for example, a number of
factors must be considered to determine whether a given complainant has a sufficient injury
to maintain the suit. See Renard v. Dade County, 261 So. 2d 832, 837 (Fla. 1972).
Two cases help illustrate the distinction between the concepts. In United States Steel
Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974), the Supreme Court of Florida held
that a nonprofit citizens' group did not have standing to sue a developer for declaratory and
injunctive relief to prevent interference with "certain alleged rights of the public generally"
to use a portion of a beach that allegedly had been acquired by prescription. Id. at 10. The
court denied standing because neither the plaintiff nor any of its members alleged any in-
jury different from that suffered by the public generally.
In Hemisphere Equity Realty Co. v. Key Biscayne Property Taxpayers Ass'n, 369 So.
2d 996 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), the court denied a neighborhood organization standing to con-
test the rezoning of certain property on Key Biscayne. The court granted standing to three
individual petitioners who lived within the rezoning area "because of the proximity of their
property to the subject property, the character of the neighborhood, and the type of zoning
proposed, stood to suffer special damages from the effects of the zoning of the subject prop-
erty." Id. at 1001; see, e.g., Upper Keys Citizens Ass'n v. Schloesser, 407 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1981) (court granted standing to a group of seventeen condominium owners whose
political clout to challenge a proposed zoning change had been diluted by trial court's insis-
tence that their individual votes be counted as one).
The opinion in Hemisphere Equity does not reveal whether or not the three individuals
belonged to the taxpayers'.association, but it does not matter for purposes of this analysis.
The very nature of a neighborhood or taxpayers' association is such that, for purposes of
suffering the type of injury necessary to challenge a zoning enactment, not all members may
have the requisite injury. Injury from a zoning ordinance necessarily depends on facts that
will vary from member to member, particularly each one's proximity to the affected site.
But the injuries to members of an employees' union or an industrial trade association result-
ing from administrative action are more uniform, even though the application of a rule to
various members may vary slightly in effect. Organizations such as the Florida Education
Association/United and the Florida Home Builders Association now qualify for standing in a
Florida court as long as they seek prospective relief that did not require the participation of
individual members. Although the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Home Builders is a
welcome alignment of Florida law with prevailing federal principles, the standing of associa-
tions must be evaluated critically to ascertain the substantiality and commonality of the
injury alleged.
201. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(1) (1981).
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(a) Specifically named persons whose substantial interests
are being determined in the proceeding.
(b) Any other person who, as a matter of constitutional
right, provision of statute, or provision of agency regulation, is
entitled to participate in whole or in part in the proceeding, or
whose substantial interests will be affected by proposed agency
action, and who makes an appearance as a party.
(c) Any other person, including an agency staff member, al-
lowed by the agency to intervene or participate in the proceed-
ing as a party. An agency may by rule authorize limited forms of
participation in agency proceedings for persons who are not eli-
gible to become parties.
02
In City of Key West v. Askew, 203 a special cabinet-level ad-
ministrative commission classified most of Monroe County as an
area of "critical state concern." Following this action, the City of
Key West and private interests in the county initiated a suit to
challenge the propriety of the commission's rule. The state moved
to dismiss the action because the commission's action was not final
and because the petitioners, as nonparties, lacked standing to sue.
The district court disagreed, finding that the commission's promul-
gation of the land planning rule was the statutory equivalent of an
administrative order under section 120.52(2), and therefore consti-
tuted final agency action.20 4 The court dispensed with the standing
issue with similar ease. It found that a city within an area de-
scribed by a state agency as an area of critical state concern has
standing to appeal the agency's decision. The definition of party in
section 120.52 includes "[s]pecifically named persons whose sub-
stantial interests are being determined in the proceeding. '2 2" Be-
cause the commission's boundary designation included Key West,
and because the challenged rule expressly affected "local govern-
ment capabilities for managing land use and development,"20 6 the
court considered the city a specifically named person with a sub-
stantial interest.
The Key West court also held that a group of citizens who had
participated in the public hearings were parties under subsection
(c) of section 120.52(9). The court granted these citizen-petitioners
standing because their previous participation in the rulemaking
202. Id. § 120.52(10).
203. 324 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).
204. Id. at 657.
205. Id. at 658 (citing FLA. STAT. § 120.52(9)(a) (Supp. 1974) (current version at §
120.52(10)(a) (1981))).
206. Id. at 657 (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE Rule 22F-8.03(A)(1) (1981)).
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proceedings made them "interested persons" eligible to seek judi-
cial review of the commission's actions.20
In Times Publishing Co. v. Department of Corrections,0 8 the
court granted standing to two newspaper companies to appeal a
Department of Corrections emergency rule that limited interviews
of death row inmates. The rule limited media access to death row
inmates whose executions were imminent. Although the logistical
and security conditions in the prison warranted emergency restric-
tions on interviews with death row prisoners generally,09 the court
held that the rule regulating interviews with inmates soon to be
executed was not sufficiently justified under section 120.54(9)(a). 10
The court granted the publishers standing to sue under section
120.68(1). The court implied that the state cannot unilaterally im-
pose restrictions on a newspaper's ability to collect and report the
news.2 11 In the absence of a justifiable policy for the rule, the pub-
lishers have every right to claim that they were "adversely af-
fected" by its application.21
A party is deemed "adversely affected" by a rule if, in pursu-
ing a legitimate objective, the party cannot voluntarily avoid the
rule's consequences. Thus, in Times Publishing the court deter-
mined that the newspapers were "adversely affected" by the
prison's media restrictions because reporters had no other way to
interview soon-to-be-executed inmates. Similarly, parents and chil-
dren who challenge school district rezoning under section 120.68
are "adversely affected" by the changes because the rules do not
provide an alternative means for a child to receive a public
education.2 1
207. Id. at 659. The court noted that previously, legislative functions such as the dele-
gation of power to the cabinet and the subsequent execution of its assigned duties, were
only reviewable if a constitutional infirmity existed and the citizen could demonstrate a
"special injury separate in kind" from the general public. Acting Chief Judge Rawls stated
with some disdain that these traditional concepts of standing have been "supplanted" by
the APA. Id. at 658.
208. 375 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
209. Id. at 310.
210. Id. at 309 & n.3 (citing FLA. STAT. § 120.54(9)(a) (Supp. 1978)).
211. 37 So. 2d at 309.
212. Id. In Times Publishing the court permitted the newspapers to appeal, although
they had not appeared at an emergency rulemaking proceeding and therefore were not "par-
ties." Since the rule had not been adopted in a formal hearing, there had been no opportu-
nity for an appearance. Nevertheless, because the appellants did not challenge the emer-
gency rulemaking procedures and the department did not contest standing because of the
appellants' failure to appear, the court found it "unnecessary to decide what opportunity for
party appearances must be given in emergency rulemaking." Id. at 309 n.3.
213. See School Bd. v. Constant, 363 So. 2d 859, 861 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (school child
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In contrast, if department rules allow one to avoid application
of a particular rule by choice, then one may not be deemed "ad-
versely affected" for purposes of challenging or appealing the oper-
ative provisions of the rule. In Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Di-
vision of Labor,214 the court denied a group of contractor
associations standing to obtain judicial review of an emergency
rule that established standards to govern the approval of appren-
ticeship programs sponsored by the state pursuant to section
120.54(9) of the Florida Statutes. The rule in question allowed a
program applicant to request that his application not be consid-
ered during the duration of the emergency. 15 In refusing to grant
the contractors standing, the court reasoned that an applicant who
declines to subject himself to the emergency rule cannot simulta-
neously claim to be "adversely affected" by the rule in order to
obtain judicial review under section 120.68(1).21
6
VII. CONCLUSION
Since its enactment, the Florida APA has become an effective
and widely used tool for challenging administrative rules and other
official agency actions. The Act represents a profound political
judgment, embodying the principle that Floridians should have a
more regularized relationship with their government's administra-
tive agencies. This relationship includes the right to a hearing for
review of agency action, and the right to preenforcement review of
both proposed and enacted administrative rules. These rights are
limited by the standing requirement of the APA. The legislature
has stated clearly that only parties "substantially affected" or
whose "substantial interests" are determined by agency action are
entitled to the benefits of the elaborate review procedures.
The standing requirement, a legitimate and necessary feature
of the APA, seeks to resolve the tension between providing ex-
panded review opportunities and protecting other important, often
countervailing, interests such as the allocation of the public re-
sources of the agencies and the courts. In rulemaking challenges,
the standing requirement protects against the adjudication of is-
sues presented by parties who lack a sufficient personal stake in
had a "substantial interest" affected by the proposed agency action); Polk v. School Bd., 373
So. 2d 960, 961 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969).
214. 355 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
215. Id. at 1247.
216. 355 So. 2d at 1247. But the court did not foreclose the possibility of entertaining
the petitioners' claim in a § 120.57 or § 120.60 proceeding.
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the outcome. This guards the rights of the proper parties against
prejudice by inappropriate or unnecessary decisions. When courts
require that certain problems await fuller development before be-
ing subject to legal challenge, then the standing doctrine of Flor-
ida's APA incorporates the ripeness doctrine of the federal courts.
The standing requirement for administrative review implicitly pro-
tects a government-regulated party from interference by others
whose interests are too attenuated to justify the intrusion. There-
fore, one who opposes on philosophic or economic grounds, some
private activity requiring official approval will generally lack stand-
ing to challenge the approval in an administrative hearing unless a
statute or the common law recognizes his interests. Otherwise, to
permit standing would unjustifiably disrupt a citizen's relationship
with the government.
Standing under the Florida APA is a critical issue of the
1980's because it defines the citizens' rights and relationships with
their government. This article has attempted to expose and de-
velop the legislative purpose and considerations supporting the
courts' decisions under the Florida APA, and to illuminate the fac-
tors governing litigants' access to administrative review.
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